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Does Generosity Beget Generosity? Alumni Giving and Undergraduate Financial Aid  
 
  We investigate how undergraduates’ financial aid packages affect their subsequent dona-
tive behavior as alumni. The empirical work is based upon a rich set of micro data on alumni 
giving at an anonymous research university, which we call Anon U. We focus on three types of 
financial aid, scholarships, loans, and campus jobs. A novel aspect of our modeling strategy is 
that, consistent with the view of some professional fundraisers, we allow the receipt of a given 
form of aid per se to affect alumni giving. At the same time, our model allows the amount of the 
support to affect giving behavior nonlinearly. 
 
Our main findings are: 1) Individuals who took out student loans are less likely to make a 
gift, other things being the same. Further, individuals who take out large loans make smaller con-
tributions as alumni, conditional on making a gift. This effect is unlikely to be due to the fact that 
repaying the loan reduces the alumnus’s capacity to give. We conjecture that, rather, it is caused 
by an “annoyance effect” — alumni resent the fact that they are burdened with loans. 2) Scholar-
ship aid reduces the size of a gift, conditional on making a gift, but has little effect on the proba-
bility of making a donation. Students who received scholarships are also less likely to be in the 
top 10 percent of givers in their class in a given year. The negative effect of receiving a scholar-
ship on the amount donated decreases in absolute value with the size of the scholarship. Again, 
we do not find any evidence of income effects, i.e., that scholarship recipients give less because 
they have relatively low incomes post graduation. 3) Aid in the form of campus jobs does not 
have a strong effect on donative behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
  Financial aid to undergraduates from their schools has been growing over time; according 
to the College Board [2010, p.3], institutional grant dollars per full-time-equivalent undergra-
duate increased at an average annual rate of about 2.8 percent over the 1999-2000 to 2009-10 
decade. At the same time, institutions of higher education have become ever more reliant on 
support from alumni contributions, which were $7.1 billion in 2010 (Council for Aid to Educa-
tion [2011]). This paper examines one potential linkage between these two trends, the possibility 
that the financial packages students receive when they are undergraduates affect their subsequent 
donative behavior as alumni. Indeed, “conventional wisdom among university fund-raisers holds 
that former scholarship recipients… are among the most dependable donors because they are 
grateful to the institution and want to lend a hand to the next generation” (Bombardieri [2007]). 
This intuition is consistent with the literature on gift exchange in charitable giving. For instance, 
Falk [2007] conducts a field experiment in which potential donors who receive a large gift with 
their solicitation donate more than those who receive a small gift, who in turn donate more than 
members of the control group, who receive no gift.  
The flip side of this argument is that students who leave college with large loans may feel 
some resentment and therefore donate less money, other things being the same. As a recent grad-
uate from Boston University said, “I got a great deal with my financial aid, but I’m still paying 
tens of thousands of dollars. And now they want more money? I think it’s just ludicrous” (quoted 
in Bombardieri [2007]). Alternatively, loan recipients might donate less simply because repaying 
the loans reduces their disposable income.  
  We investigate these and related hypotheses using a rich set of micro data on alumni giv-
ing at an anonymous private research university, which we will call Anon U. We follow a group 
of about 13,000 alumni who graduated between 1993 and 2005. The panel nature of the data al-
lows us to examine issues relating to the time pattern of giving, in particular, the frequency with 
which individuals make gifts. Such questions cannot be addressed by previous studies, which 
have tended to look at either a single year’s worth of data, or have examined average giving over 
a number of years. In addition, our data provide a more detailed characterization of financial aid 2 
 
packages than has been available to previous researchers. In particular, in addition to grants and 
loan aid, we also have information on earnings from campus jobs. 
  Section 2 of the paper reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the data. We 
present the econometric specification and results in Section 4. Our main findings are: 1) The 
mere fact of taking out a student loan decreases the probability that an individual will contribute 
to the university as an alumnus. Further, individuals who take out large student loans make 
smaller contributions as alumni, conditional on making a gift. Taking advantage of correlates of 
income that are in our data set, we argue that this negative impact is unlikely to be due to the fact 
that alumni who took out loans have relatively low disposable incomes. We conjecture that, ra-
ther, it is caused by an “annoyance effect” — alumni resent the fact that they received loans ra-
ther than outright grants. 2) Financial aid received in the form of scholarships reduces the size of 
a gift, conditional on making a gift, but has little effect on the probability of making a gift. Stu-
dents who received scholarships are also less likely to be in the top 10 percent of givers in their 
class in a given year. Again, we do not find any evidence of income effects, i.e., that undergra-
duates who received scholarships give less because they have relatively low incomes as adults 
One possible explanation is that scholarship recipients prefer to give to charities other than their 
alma mater. Interestingly, among the group of scholarship recipients, subsequent donations in-
crease with the size of the scholarship (although the amounts are still less than for non-grant re-
cipients). This suggests that at least some kind of gift exchange motive is present among scholar-
ship awardees. 3) Aid in the form of campus jobs does not have a strong effect on donative be-
havior. 
Section 5 discusses some alternative specifications of the model in order to assess the ro-
bustness of our results. In particular, we allow individuals’ responses to the composition of their 
aid packages to depend on their demographic characteristics. We find some differences across 
racial groups, but the responses of men and women are about the same. Additionally, and some-
what surprisingly, the effects of having received aid do not change greatly as alumni age. We 
conclude in Section 6 with a summary and suggestions for future research. 3 
 
2. Previous Literature 
  Several papers have used institutional level data to study the link between financial aid 
packages and subsequent alumni giving.
1 Ficano and Cunningham [2002] characterize financial 
aid as the percentage of the cost of attending the institution full time that is rebated in the forms 
of need based scholarships, non-need based scholarships, and student loans from college funds. 
They find that more generous need-based scholarships are associated with higher subsequent 
alumni donations. Baade and Sundberg [1996] include in their model the percentage of students 
who receive financial aid, along with scholarship and fellowship amounts per student. They find 
no effect of scholarship aid on alumni giving, and negative effects for the percentage receiving 
financial aid only for liberal arts schools. While interesting, the results of studies using institu-
tional level data must be regarded with caution because the cultures and histories of different col-
leges are highly diverse. Hence, unobserved variables such as the style of university governance 
could be driving both financial aid policy and alumni giving patterns.  
  An alternative strategy that avoids this problem is to use micro data from a single or sev-
eral institutions, a tack taken by Clotfelter [2001], Monks [2003] and Holmes [2009]. The impact 
of financial aid is not the main focus of any of these studies, and the characterizations of individ-
uals’ undergraduate aid packages are consequently not very detailed. Clotfelter’s model of alum-
ni giving includes only a dichotomous variable indicating whether an individual received finan-
cial aid, Monks includes the size of any loans and an indicator for whether they were a “major” 
or “minor” source of support, and Holmes includes dichotomous variables both for whether the 
individual received loans or grants. Their substantive results differ across papers and sometimes 
within the same paper. Clotfelter finds that for some cohorts of individuals, the receipt of need-
based financial aid depressed future giving, but for others, there was no statistically significant 
effect. Monks’ results suggest that recipients of financial aid are more likely to make subsequent 
donations but loans depress the likelihood of making gifts, while Holmes finds that neither the 
receipt of grants nor loans affects donative behavior. This is similar to the result of McDearmon 
and Shirley [2009], whose analysis of online survey data (as opposed to administrative data) 
suggests that neither financial awards nor student loans affect alumni giving. 
                                                 
1 While the literature on the effect of financial aid on behavior after college is rather sparse, there has been a good 
deal of literature on the effects of financial aid before  college, i.e., on college attendance decisions. See, for 
example, Dynarski [2000]. 4 
 
  Marr et al. [2005] examine the amounts given by the individuals in their sample over the 
first eight years after they graduated. Their data allow them to include a quite detailed characteri-
zation of financial aid packages. They consider amounts of need-based loans, need-based scho-
larships, merit-based scholarships, and athletic scholarships. They find that loans decrease both 
the probability and amount of giving, and need-based scholarships have the opposite effect. They 
enter their variables as step functions, and there is some evidence that the effects of loans and 
scholarships are nonlinear. Their econometric model does not attempt to take advantage of the 
longitudinal nature of their data set because so few individuals make contributions in any given 
year. Rather, their focus is on whether or not the individual made any gift during the eight-year 
period after graduation. Such averages can mask substantial heterogeneity; someone who gives 
once during an extended period of time is treated as being exactly the same as someone who 
makes a donation every year.  
  Our data set, described below, includes a rich set of information relating to the structure 
of financial aid packages, including income from on-campus jobs, which has not been studied 
before. In addition, unlike previous studies, we track a subset of the individuals in our sample 
over a sufficiently long period of time that we can make at least some inferences with respect to 
whether the effects of the financial aid package diminish with time. Our econometric procedure 
takes advantage of the longitudinal nature of the data set, allowing us, for example, to compare 
patterns of giving rather than just a snapshot of a single year’s donations.  
 
3. Data 
Our data are drawn from Anon U’s administrative archives. The data are proprietary and 
sensitive, and individuals’ names were stripped from the records before being made available to 
us. Our sample consists of all individuals who graduated between 1993 and 2005. We have each 
individual’s giving history from the year after graduation until 2009. Our unit of observation is a 
yearly giving opportunity. For example, if an individual has been an alumna for 5 years, she ac-
counts for 5 giving opportunities, starting in the first fiscal year after graduation. Multiple gifts in 
the same year are summed together. We begin with 142,874 observations, representing 14,382 
alumni. We delete 5,175 observations because of missing or unreliable data, leaving 137,699 ob-
servations on 13,831 alumni. Of these observations, 84,394 (or 61.3 percent) are associated with 
a gift. 5 
 
  At Anon U, eligible students can receive aid in the form of scholarships, loans and cam-
pus jobs. About 49.6 percent of the individuals in our sample received any financial aid at all 
during their time at Anon U. 44.7 percent received some scholarship aid; 40.4 percent received 
aid in the form of a campus job, and 43.0 percent received loans; 34.8 percent received all three 
types of aid.
2 All scholarships are need based; there are no athletic or merit scholarships given by 
the university. Conditional on receiving a scholarship, the average amount received during a stu-
dent’s undergraduate career is $71,471 (s.d. = $45,921).  
During our sample period, the average interest rate on student loans was about 7 percent, 
and the repayment period was 10 years beginning at graduation. 
3 (If a student went directly to 
graduate school, repayment of the loans was deferred, and the 10 year clock started when gradu-
ate school was completed.)
4 Conditional on receiving a loan, the average amount over the indi-
vidual’s undergraduate career is $15,633 (s.d. = $8,308).  
Campus jobs typically involved 9 or 10 hours of work per week for the 30 weeks of the 
academic year; the average amount of money from campus jobs is $9,544 (s.d. = $4,429).
5 This 
figure includes remuneration from both positions arranged by the financial aid office as well as 
other  jobs  such as research assistants.
6  Appendix  Table  A1  shows  the average amounts  per 
alumnus of scholarship, job, and loan aid during students’ four years, measured in thousands of 
dollars, conditional on each source of aid being positive. The unit of observation for this table is 
a yearly giving opportunity as defined above.  
                                                 
2 These figures include aid that came from sources external to the university. Our data do not allow us to distinguish 
between funds received from the university and external funds. However, over 93 percent of scholarship aid comes 
from university sources. 
3 In 2001, Anon U moved to a no-loan policy; the class of 2005 was the first to have all four undergraduate years 
under this policy. Financial need was fully met by grants and campus jobs and aid that previously would have come 
in the form of loans came as grants instead. However, students were still able to take out loans to meet costs in 
excess of their calculated financial need; thus, some positive loans are still recorded for those classes, though their 
prevalence is much lower. Since the policy is relatively recent, it is difficult to get precise estimates of its effects on 
alumni giving, particularly because they are not distinguishable from cohort effects. A  comparison of giving 
behavior in the first 5 years after graduation before and after the policy shows very little effect. However, given the 
problems with identifying the impact and the small number of affected cohorts in our sample, one cannot make too 
much of this finding. 
4 The average loan repayment during the 10-year period for a member of the class of 2001 was about $166 per 
month. 
5 The median values for loan, scholarship, and job aid, respectively, are $15,961; 69,503; and $10,544. 
6 Income from campus jobs not arranged by the financial aid office is recorded only for aid recipients; a student not 
on financial aid who worked as, say, a research assistant would not have his or her income reported here. Informa-
tion on off-campus jobs is not available. 6 
 
We also have information on the alumnus’s undergraduate extracurricular activities, post 
graduate education, residence, whether he or she is married to another graduate of Anon U, SAT 
scores, academic honors, ethnicity, type of high school, summary evaluations made by the Ad-
missions Office during the application process, major and minor course of study, and grade point 
average. Summary statistics for these other variables are included in Table A1 as well. 
 
4. Econometric Specification and Results 
  4.1 Econometric Specification 
Previous empirical work on the determinants of giving suggests that variables can have 
different effects on the decision whether or not to donate — the extensive margin — than on the 
decision how much to donate, conditional on making a gift — the intensive margin.
7 A statistical 
model that allows for this possibility is therefore needed. We assume that each alumnus first 
chooses whether or not to make a gift and then, conditional on making a gift, decides how much 
to donate. Following Huck and Rasul [2007], a natural specification is a hurdle model. In our 
context, the first step in the implementation of the hurdle model is to estimate a linear probability 
model for whether or not the individual makes a gift.
8 The second step is to use ordinary least 
squares on the positive observations to analyze the decision about how much to give. In order to 
make causal inferences from the second-stage estimates, one must assume that the second stage 
is conditionally independent of the first. We discuss this further below. We correct for correla-
tion among the error terms for any given individual with a clustering procedure.  
An alternative two-step procedure, suggested by Heckman [1979], can also be used to es-
timate the amount of giving, conditional on it being positive. Heckman’s model augments the 
OLS equation in the second stage with the inverse Mills ratio. There is some controversy in the 
literature with respect to which estimator is superior (Leung and Yu [1996]); hence, a sensible 
approach is to estimate the model both ways. We show below that our substantive results are es-
sentially unchanged when we use Heckman’s method.  
                                                 
7 Thus, for example, it would not be appropriate to use a Tobit model, which imposes the constraint that the 
marginal effect of a given variable on the probability of giving and the marginal effect on the amount given are the 
same up to a constant of proportionality. 
8 It is more common to use a probit model for this first stage. However, the interpretation of the marginal effects in 
the presence of quadratic terms and interactions is less intuitive in non-linear models than in the linear probability 
model, so we prefer the latter. This issue is described in more detail below. 7 
 
As is typical, a few relatively large gifts account for a disproportionate amount of Anon 
U’s donations. For example, in our analysis sample, the top one percent of gifts in 2009 ac-
counted for 50.8 percent of total giving. These large gifts are critical to the university, so it is 
important to determine whether financial aid packages affect the likelihood of such gifts. We 
therefore also use a linear probability model to estimate the probability that the alumnus is a 
“class leader” in a given year, where a class leader is defined as an individual who donated an 
amount greater than or equal to the 90
th percentile of gifts in his or her class. Given that, by con-
struction, the mean of the left hand side variable in this model is about 0.10, the linear probabili-
ty model might not be appropriate. In Section 5 below we show that our substantive results are 
very much the same when we estimate the class leader model using a probit. Another issue re-
lates to the fact that our data contain a few very large outliers. For example, there are 11 gifts 
greater than $100,000 in our sample. To address this issue, we use the logarithm of the amount of 
giving on the left hand side of the equation for the intensive margin. As an additional check to 
make sure that outliers are not driving our results, we estimate the OLS equation with the top one 
percent of the observations eliminated. In Section 5 we show that the substantive results with re-
spect to the impact of financial aid are unchanged.  
A major issue is how to characterize the structure of undergraduates’ financial aid pack-
ages. The conjectures about the possible effects of financial aid discussed above suggest that we 
need a specification that allows us to address the following questions: does the mere receipt of a 
particular form of aid have an effect on giving; what is the marginal effect of receiving additional 
aid of a given type; and what is the overall effect of a given aid package? With that in mind, we 
adopt a somewhat novel modeling strategy, and include both a dichotomous variable that takes a 
value of one if the individual received any aid of a given type, as well as a quadratic in the 
amount of that kind of aid.  
The dichotomous term allows for the possibility that the receipt of a particular form of 
aid per se affects subsequent giving. Fundraising professionals are keenly aware of this mechan-
ism. The Vice-President for Development at Boston University, discussing it in the context of the 
impact of college loans on giving behavior, said that he was concerned about a “psychological 
debt burden. Whether your debt is $200 or $200,000, you don’t tend to write checks as long as 
you have it” (Bombardieri [2007]). It is also possible that students who took out loans have low-
er family incomes than their peers, or perhaps developed less of an affinity for Anon U when 8 
 
they were undergraduates. We discuss the interpretation of the coefficient on the indicator varia-
ble in more detail below.  
The quadratic terms allow for nonlinearity in the impact of the amount of the form of 
aid.
9 We choose a quadratic over a logarithmic function for two reasons. First, for many individ-
uals, the amount of aid is zero. Second, the interesting question facing university administrators 
is generally how given dollar amounts of different types of financial aid (as opposed to a given 
percentage changes) affect future giving, and the quadratic specification facilitates such compari-
sons. A related reason for using levels rather than logs is that it allows a direct test of the hypo-
thesis that alumni react similarly to the same amount of undergraduate aid that comes in different 
forms (Avery and Hoxby [2004]).  
In addition, we include on the right hand side a series of variables about each alumnus 
that have been shown in previous studies to exert an important influence on alumni giving.
10 
These include years since graduation, gender, ethnicity, SAT scores, ranking of the candidate by 
the admissions office when they applied to Anon U, course of study, and post-baccalaureate edu-
cation. The literature also shows that alumni giving is heavily influenced by the affinity that they 
develop for their schools as undergraduates. Participation in varsity sports and membership in 
fraternities are two ways in which such affinities develop (Clotfelter [2003], Monks [2003]); we 
include variables relating to these activities. The model also includes time effects, class effects, 
and location effects. The year effects reflect the impacts of the business cycle, the stock market, 
and so on.
11 The year effects also account for the size of Anon U’s fundraising staff and the 
amount of its fundraising expenditures, which vary from year to year. The class effects control 
for common influences on alumni in the same class, such as the political milieu when they were 
undergraduates, the presence of certain professors or administrators, and so on. Summary statis-
tics for these variables are recorded in Table A1. 
Unfortunately, our data include no direct information on income, an important determi-
nant of alumni giving (Shulman and Bowen [2001, p. 404]). To address this issue, we begin by 
noting that a number of the variables in our basic specification are correlated with the individu-
al’s income, including gender, ethnicity, college major and grade point average, advanced de-
                                                 
9 Adding a cubic term did not significantly improve the explanatory power of the equation. 
10 See, for example, Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano [2002], Shulman and Bowen [2001], Lara and Johnson [2008], 
and Holmes [2009]).  
11 Bristol [1991] emphasizes the role of the stock market and Ehrenberg and Smith [2001] document the importance 
of macroeconomic conditions. 9 
 
grees, years since graduation, and location. In addition, as noted below, we augment the basic 
model with a number of variables that are closely related to permanent income, including the 
sector in which the individual works, inter alia, and find that our substantive results are not sen-
sitive to their inclusion.  
  4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Probability of Giving  
Table 1 shows the effects of the financial aid variables on the probability of making a 
gift. For each type of aid, we exhibit the estimated coefficients and standard errors for both the 
linear and quadratic terms, as well as for the dichotomous variable indicating  whether the 
individual received that form of aid at all. In addition to the financial aid variables in the table, 
the models include the other right hand side variables mentioned in the previous section, which 
are suppressed for brevity.  
To begin, consider the results for loans in the first panel. The coefficient of -0.0357 on 
the dichotomous variable Any Loan Aid in the first column means that the receipt of a loan in 
itself lowers the probability that an alumnus makes a gift by about 3.6 percentage points. Given 
that the mean rate of giving is about 62 percent, it would seem fair to characterize this as a 
meaningful although not huge effect.  
 The positive linear term and negative quadratic term imply that, in absolute value, the 
negative effect on the probability of giving first decreases and then increases with the amount of 
the loan; indeed, when the function reaches its maximal value (when loans are around $13,000), 
the overall effect is a much weaker, -0.88 percentage points (s.e. = 1.12 percentage points). The 
negative quadratic term then begins to dominate and by the time the loan amount is about 
$23,000, the effect is once more significantly different from zero at the 5 percent  level. 
Essentially, receipt of small or large loans reduces the probability of giving, while moderate-
sized loans have little effect. While we cannot definitively state what is driving these results, a 
possible explanation is that the annoyance effect of small loans is diminished by gratitude for 
moderate amounts of aid, while large loans feel like a burden.  
One potential reason that student loans reduce the likelihood of making a gift is that stu-
dents who took out loans subsequently have lower incomes than other alumni, perhaps because 
they come from families with relatively low incomes, and have less wealth as well as fewer 
family connections to help them professionally. It follows that to the extent donations to Anon U 10 
 
are a normal good, alumni who took out loans will be less likely to make donations. In other 
words, if loan aid as an undergraduate is correlated with income as an alumnus, then the omis-
sion of income from the right hand side might bias the coefficients on loan aid (and other kinds 
of aid as well).
12 While we do not have explicit measures of income in our data, we do have sev-
eral variables that are correlated with income. Specifically, for a subset of our alumni (114,108 
observations, representing 11,124  alumni), we have information that is closely related to 
permanent income, the fields in which they work. The fields of education, finance, health care 
and law are highly represented. The complete distribution of fields across the sample is available 
upon request.
13 If income effects are behind the estimated effects of the financial aid variables, 
then when these correlates of income are included in the model, the coefficients on the financial 
aid variables should change.  
The results when the model is estimated with the field variables are shown in the second 
column of Table 1.
14 A comparison with the estimates for our basic model in the first column 
indicates that they are essentially unchanged. This is consistent with the notion that income ef-
fects are not responsible for our results on the impact of loan aid.  
To investigate this issue further, we take advantage of the fact that we have information 
on ZIP code, another correlate of income. We re-estimate the basic model including a dichotom-
ous variable for each three-digit ZIP code.
15 The results, which are in the third column, are not 
substantively different from those in Column (1) either.
16  
The starting point for our final check for the presence of income effects is the well-
known observation that the incomes of children and their parents are positively correlated. (See, 
for example, Behrman and Taubman [1990].) Presumably this correlation is stronger for relative-
                                                 
12 A related possibility is that repayment of loans diminishes disposable income, which also could reduce donations. 
We present evidence below that this phenomenon is unlikely to explain our findings. 
13 Due to lack of reliable data regarding the start- and stop-dates of occupation and field, these variables indicate 
whether the alumnus was ever involved in that field or occupation, rather than whether they are involved during the 
particular year of observation. 
14 In order to benchmark this exercise, we estimated the basic model (i.e., the model without the occupation and field 
variables) using the smaller sample that includes only the observations with the occupation and field variables. 
These results, too, were substantively the same as those in Column (1). 
15 For alumni living abroad, we include indicators for their country.  
16 A related approach is to include ZIP-code-level measures of income as regressors instead of three-digit ZIP code 
dichotomous variables. Implementing this strategy is difficult because income data are unavailable for some areas 
and we lack a consistent income data on a yearly basis. Nevertheless, we obtain median income data from the 2000 
Census and the 2008 IRS Statistics of Income and, separately, map them into each alumnus’s ZIP code in each year. 
While these income variables are statistically significant in the expected direction, neither variable’s inclusion has a 
substantial effect on the coefficients on the financial aid variables. Full results are available on request. 11 
 
ly young individuals, such as the members of our sample, the oldest of whom are about 38 years 
old at the end of the sample period. Because aid recipients need to submit evidence of their fi-
nancial need, we know parental income for alumni who received financial aid as undergraduates. 
While this is clearly not a random subset of our analysis sample, it is of some interest to see 
whether the inclusion of parental income for members of this group affects our conclusions with 
respect to the impact of financial aid.
17 To construct a benchmark for this analysis, we begin by 
re-estimating our basic model from Column (1) for this sample, and then augment the model 
with parents’ income. In results available upon request, we find that the coefficients on the fi-
nancial aid variables are not materially affected. Given the particular nature of this sample, and 
that parental income is only a proxy for the alumnus’s income, we cannot argue too strongly that 
this exercise rules out the presence of income effects; nevertheless, the preponderance of the evi-
dence suggests that such effects are not driving our results. 
We turn next to the results for scholarships in the second panel. The intercept, linear, and 
quadratic terms in Column (1) are all very small in magnitude and imprecisely estimated. One 
cannot reject the hypothesis that scholarship aid has no effect on the likelihood of making a 
donation. Looking across the columns, we see that when we include our additional correlates of 
income, the substantive results do not change—income effects do not appear to be behind the 
results.  
The last panel has the results for campus jobs. The intercept suggests that receiving this 
form of aid per se has no discernible impact on the probability of making a gift. The amount of 
aid from campus jobs has a small negative effect (roughly 0.58 percentage points per thousand 
dollars) on the probability of giving until about $7,500 of aid, at which point the positive 
quadratic term dominates; the effect on giving at this point is a statistically significant but rela-
tively small -0.031 (s.e. = 0.014). Aid through campus jobs does not appear to be an important 
determinant of the likelihood of making a contribution. 
4.2.2 Amount of Giving 
Table 2 shows the estimates for the log of the conditional amount of giving. The first 
panel indicates that while none of the individual coefficients on aid from loans is significant, the 
set of loan variables is jointly significant at p = 0.002. The point estimate of the intercept for 
                                                 
17 For most of the analysis sample, we have the students’ ZIP codes at the time of application to Anon U, a variable 
that is correlated with family income. The inclusion of indicators for family three-digit ZIP code did not materially 
affect the estimates of the coefficients on the financial aid variables. 12 
 
loans, -0.0679, implies that the receipt of loan aid reduces donations by about 6.6 percent. The 
negative linear term dominates over the entire range of loan values,   and the overall (negative) 
effect  becomes  statistically significant at around $3,000 of loans.  As discussed above, one 
possible explanation for this phenomenon is that alumni who took out larger loans as undergra-
duates have relatively low incomes. However, as was the case in Table 1, a look across the col-
umns indicates that augmenting the model with various correlates of income has little effect on 
the estimates, so income effects are unlikely to be at work.  
In the second panel of Table 2, which looks at the impacts of scholarships, the striking 
result is the coefficient on Any Scholarship Aid, which indicates that the receipt of a scholarship 
in itself lowers giving by about 18 percent, an effect that is precisely estimated. The negative 
effect of receiving a scholarship per se is attenuated by the positive though imprecisely estimated 
linear term. Indeed, at the conditional mean of $71,000, the estimated decrease is only half as 
large, -0.092 (s.e. = 0.043). It becomes insignificantly different from zero (though still relatively 
large in magnitude) at around $90,000 of scholarship aid, and at the conditional 99
th percentile of 
scholarship aid, $170,000, the effect is -0.045 (s.e. = 0.071). Thus, larger scholarships are 
associated with negative, though smaller in absolute value, effects on the size of donations 
conditional on giving.  
In the third panel, we see that aid from campus jobs does not have a statistically discerni-
ble effect on the amount of giving. 
4.2.3. Class Leadership 
 Table 3 shows the estimates for class leadership. To put these figures in perspective, 
recall that by construction, the mean value of the probability of being a class leader is about 0.10. 
Hence, the point estimate of the loan intercept in Column (1) of the first panel, 0.9 percentage 
points, is substantial, although imprecisely estimated. The quadratic term is minuscule, and the 
linear term suggests that each thousand dollar increase in loans reduces the probability of being a 
class leader by about 0.07 percentage points. While this effect is extremely small on the margin, 
the overall effect of loans becomes statistically significantly different from zero at around $6,000 
of loan aid.  
The effects of receiving scholarship aid on the likelihood of being a class leader are in the 
second panel. The estimate of the intercept in Column (1) is large, about negative 3.3 percentage 
points, and precisely estimated. But at the conditional mean of scholarship aid, one cannot reject 13 
 
the hypothesis that the effect on being a class leader is zero, though the point estimate is still fair-
ly substantial; the overall effect is -0.014 with a standard error of 0.009. In the third panel, we 
see that aid from campus jobs has no discernible effect on the probability of being a class leader. 
As was the case in Tables 1 and 2, a glance across columns indicates that the results are not sen-
sitive to the addition of variables that are correlated with income. 
4.3 Interpreting the Results  
We begin with the results for loans. The mere fact that an individual took out a student 
loan reduces both the probability of making a gift and its size, conditional on making a gift. This 
finding is consistent with the belief of development professionals, mentioned above, that taking 
on debt per se creates a kind of psychological burden that is independent of the amount of the 
debt.  
We have argued that this finding is unlikely to be due to the fact that undergraduates who 
took out loans subsequently have lower incomes than their classmates. Another observation con-
sistent with this notion is that the intercept term in the model for the probability of making a gift 
is negative, and dominates the positive linear term for relatively small loans. In short, smaller 
loans have a more pronounced negative effect on giving than medium-sized loans, though large 
loans depress giving on both the intensive and extensive margins. This nonlinear relationship is 
difficult to reconcile with the notion that income effects are driving our results.  
Another possible explanation for the negative effect of loan aid on the probability of 
making a gift is that loan recipients felt excluded from the majority campus culture when they 
were undergraduates; hence, their affinity for Anon U is lower. To investigate this possibility, we 
begin by noting a robust finding in the literature, that individual who participate in fraterni-
ties/sororities and varsity sports develop stronger affinities to their colleges, ceteris paribus. (See 
Clotfelter [2003] and Monks [2003].) If so, the negative effect of loans on giving should be less 
in absolute value for individuals who were involved in these activities, other things being the 
same. We augmented our basic models from the first columns of Tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively, 
with a set of interactions between the financial aid variables and both participation in fraterni-
ties/sororities and participation in varsity athletics. The interaction terms were neither individual-
ly nor jointly significant. Hence, the negative effect of loans on the probability of making a gift 
does not appear to be due to the fact that loan recipients were somehow alienated from the cam-
pus culture, at least to the extent the majority culture can be characterized by these measures.  14 
 
A final possibility is that there is an “annoyance effect” associated with having to pay 
back loans. Given that the results do not seem to be driven by income or ties to the majority so-
cial culture, it is difficult to put forward an explanation other than this psychological burden, 
mentioned above. That is, loan recipients resent the fact that their aid came in the form of loans 
rather than grants, and consequently, give less to Anon U.  
Turning next to the scholarship results, it is again tempting to attribute the negative 
effects in Tables 2 and 3 to income effects, which could come about if scholarship recipients 
have lower incomes than their classmates, and this situation persists after graduation. We have 
already argued, however, that this is unlikely to be the case. Another problem with an income-
effect interpretation relates to the observation that the negative effect of receiving a scholarship 
falls (in absolute value) with the size of the scholarship. Given that scholarships at Anon U are 
entirely need-based, this means that scholarship students from lower-income families give more 
than those from higher-income families, ceteris paribus. To the extent that children’s incomes 
are related to their parents’ incomes, then if income effects were driving the results, we would 
expect just the opposite.  
Another  conjecture  is that scholarship recipients might have felt alienated from the 
majority culture at Anon U, and hence developed less of an affinity for the institution. However, 
just as was the case for loan recipients, we find no evidence that alumni who are likely to have 
developed relatively strong affinities to the institution react differently to the receipt of scholar-
ships than other aid recipients. Moreover, one would expect lower affinity to be reflected in a 
lower probability of giving, not just a smaller amount conditional on giving. Hence, we are in-
clined to discount this explanation.  
How, then, can we account for the negative effects of scholarships on subsequent giving? 
One possibility is that scholarship recipients might be targeting their donations to other institu-
tions that extend grant aid to students who want to attend college, such as Scholarship America 
or the United Negro College Fund. Of course, given that we have no information on alumni’s 
other charitable donations, this notion remains conjectural. 
It is tempting to argue that because scholarship recipients give less than others, one can 
reject  the  hypothesis  that they want to “give back.”  However,  the negative impact on the 
conditional giving to Anon U falls as the amount of the scholarship increases; that is, those who 15 
 
received more generous aid as undergraduates give more as alumni, conditional on making a gift. 
In this limited sense, then, our data are consistent with the gift exchange hypothesis.  
 
5. Alternative Specifications 
  In this section we estimate several alternative specifications of the model in order to 
assess the robustness of our results. 
  5.1 Outliers 
As is the case at most universities, a few large gifts account for a disproportionate share 
of total donations to Anon U. As noted earlier, the top one percent of positive gifts in our sample 
accounted for about half of the total in 2009.  This raises the possibility that our results for 
amounts given in Table 2 are being driven by just a few observations. Our use of logs for the left 
hand side variables attenuates the impact of outliers, but as another check, we re-estimate the 
model for amounts given deleting the top one percent of donations in each column from the 
sample. When we compare these results, available on request, to their counterparts in Table 2, 
we see that the signs and magnitudes are similar. Hence, outliers do not appear to be driving our 
results with respect to giving on the intensive margin.  
5.2 Demographic Differences 
Previous empirical research indicates that various aspects of altruistic behavior can differ 
substantially by  demographic group.  (See, for example,  Andreoni and Vesterlund [2001], 
Andreoni [2005], and Meer and Rosen [2009].) This raises the possibility that the impact of 
financial aid might as well. We therefore investigated how our parameter estimates vary by race, 
gender, and age. To do so, we augmented our basic models from the first columns of Tables 1 
through 3, respectively, with a series of terms interacting the financial aid variables first with the 
indicator variables for race, then with gender, and finally with age.  
The detailed results are presented in the Appendix. The main substantive findings can be 
summarized as follows:  
5.2.1 Race  
One cannot reject the joint hypothesis that the interactions between the race and financial 
aid variables are zero. However, some of the interaction terms are individually significant. For 
instance, the effect of loans on the probability of giving is different for black alumni than other 
ethnic groups; the linear term is negative while the intercept is positive (the latter is significant at 16 
 
p = 0.08). Receiving a scholarship does not have any substantial effect on the size of a gift for 
Asian alumni. With a few other exceptions, there is little difference across races in the effect of 
financial aid on alumni giving.  
5.2.2 Gender 
The interaction terms between gender and the financial aid variables are jointly 
significant for the case of scholarship aid in the model for giving on the extensive margin; 
otherwise, they are not. The most striking difference is that the negative effect of receiving a 
scholarship is especially pronounced for alumnae, particularly on the probability of being a class 
leader.  
5.2.3 Age 
For purposes of examining the impact of age on the response to financial age packages, 
we create a dichotomous variable that takes a value of one if an alumnus graduated 10 or more 
years ago and zero otherwise, and interact it with our financial aid variables. Our sample for this 
specification consists only of individuals who graduated  in  1999 or earlier, whose giving 
behavior we observe  both before and after the 10-year mark.  One cannot reject the joint 
hypothesis that the interactions between the financial aid and age variables are zero. This result 
might be a bit surprising.  One  could  imagine, for example, that any  gift exchange motive 
associated with being a scholarship student  could  either increase  (because of nostalgia)  or 
decrease (because of forgetfulness) with age. Similarly, one might conjecture that any negative 
feelings associated with having to pay back loans might be less after the loans are paid off. 
However, we find no evidence that the effect of financial aid packages on future giving depends 
on how long it is since the alumnus graduated. The “annoyance effect” associated with receiving 
loans appears to persist beyond the repayment period. 
This finding also relates to our previous discussion of whether our results on the impact 
of loans are due to income effects. We focused on the possibility that individuals who received 
loan aid have lower incomes as alumni. But an income effect could also arise if the repayment of 
a loan reduces an individual’s disposable income, ceteris paribus. However, if this were the case, 
we would expect the negative effect of loans to disappear or at least be attenuated after they are 
paid off. We find no statistically significant difference in the impact of loan aid on the donative 
behavior of individuals who have been out of school for more than ten years (and have generally 
paid off their loans) and those who are younger. 17 
 
5.3 Alternative Econometric Specifications  
  We have used the convenient linear probability model to estimate the equations for the 
dichotomous left hand side variables, DidGive and ClassLeader. As is well-known, a possible 
problem with the linear probability model is that the predicted values may be outside the range 
zero to one, which is especially likely to be an issue when the mean of the variable is close to 
zero or one. For DidGive, whose mean is about 0.61, this is unlikely to be an issue.
18 In fact, 
when we estimated the basic model of Column (1) in Table 1 using a probit model, we found es-
sentially identical average marginal effects.
  
Given that, by construction, the mean of ClassLeader is about 0.10, the problem is poten-
tially a greater concern for those estimates. When we estimated the ClassLeader model of Col-
umn (1) in Table 3 using a probit, we found the following average marginal effects: -0.00092 
(s.e. = 0.00084) for loans, 0.00042  (s.e. = 0.00022) for scholarships, and -0.00115  (s.e. = 
0.00151) for campus jobs. These are not dissimilar to the average marginal effects calculated 
from the model in Column (1) of Table 3: -0.00072 (s.e. = 0.00064) for loans, 0.00028 (s.e. = 
0.00013) for scholarships, and -0.00039 (s.e. = 0.00106) for campus jobs.  
Another econometric issue relates to the use of the hurdle model. An alternative estimator 
augments the OLS equation for the amount given with the inverse Mills ratio generated by the 
first stage probit (Heckman [1979]). This model explicitly allows for correlation between the er-
rors in the first and second stage equations. The econometric literature indicates that the desira-
bility of this estimator relative to the hurdle model is unclear. In particular, Leung and Yu [1996] 
observe that even if the errors in the true model are correlated, the hurdle model may, under cer-
tain circumstances, yield better estimates. Also, in the absence of variables that can be excluded 
from the second stage but still affect the probability of giving, which is our situation, identifica-
tion comes entirely off of functional form assumptions. 
In any case, it seems sensible to re-estimate the model using Heckman’s approach to see 
if the substantive results are affected. They are not. For instance, using the selection model, the 
effect of receiving a loan on the likelihood of making a gift is -3.7 percentage points, and the ef-
fect on the conditional size of the gift is -6.58 percent. The comparable results from our basic 
specification are -3.6 percentage points and -6.56 percent, respectively. The other variables are 
                                                 
18 Fewer than one percent of the predicted values are outside the range zero to one.  18 
 
similarly close in magnitude. Hence, our results are robust with respect to this change in econo-
metric specification. 
   
6. Conclusion 
  College and university fundraisers are justifiably interested in the impact of undergra-
duate financial aid packages on future gift-giving by alumni. Do students who receive loans or 
who need to take campus jobs give less in the future because they are resentful? Do scholarship 
recipients donate more because they want to “give back?” We have analyzed micro data from a 
selective research university to address these questions. We find that the mere act of taking out a 
student loan decreases the probability that an individual will contribute to the university as an 
alumnus, and that large student loans reduce future donations, conditional on making a gift. Fi-
nancial aid received in the form of scholarships reduces the amount of alumni giving, conditional 
on making a gift, but has little effect on the probability of making a gift. Students who received 
scholarships are also less likely to be in the top 10 percent of givers in their class in a given year. 
We find no evidence that the negative effects of loans and scholarships on subsequent giving are 
due to aid recipients having lower post-graduation incomes than their peers. Nor is there any evi-
dence that scholarship recipients give less because they did not feel part of the majority culture 
on campus when they were undergraduates. We conjecture that their charitable giving might be 
focused on organizations other than their relatively wealthy alma mater.  
Our results provide mixed evidence for the gift exchange model. As just noted, it does 
not appear that out of gratefulness, alumni who received financial aid give back to the university 
more generously than alumni who received no aid. Indeed, scholarship recipients give less than 
their classmates, ceteris paribus. However, among the group of scholarship awardees, those who 
received larger grants make larger donations as alumni, providing some evidence for a gift ex-
change motive. In any case, to the extent our findings generalize, universities should not expect 
that generous financial aid will pay for itself through larger donations in the future. Of course, 
there remain myriad reasons to maintain these policies apart from the financial status of the uni-
versity.  
An important qualification is that our results do not necessarily reflect the causal impacts 
of financial aid.  Rather, despite the fact that our statistical model controls for a variety  of 
demographic and family background characteristics, financial aid recipients might differ from 19 
 
their peers in ways that affect the affinity they develop for their alma mater. Indeed, the most 
important channel through which major changes in financial aid policy affect alumni  giving 
might be the impact on the composition of the student body. Put another way, our results are best 
thought of as estimates of local effects, that is, the impacts of modifying the parameters of an 
existing financial aid program rather than rather than implementing  an entirely new policy. 
Another caveat is that our results are based on data from a single selective research university. 
Consequently,  one must be cautious about assuming that the results would apply to other 
institutions as well. Still, it seems safe to say that university fundraisers’ belief that financial aid 
packages affect future alumni giving are well founded. 20 
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Appendix 
 
  Appendix Table A1 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in our econo-
metric model. The remaining tables show the results when we augment our basic models with 
interactions of the financial aid variables with indicators for race, gender, and age, respectively.  
  Table A2 shows the outcomes when we interact the financial aid variables with the indi-
cators for race.
19 Consider the first panel, which shows the results for loans. We do not report the 
regression coefficients themselves. Rather, for each racial category, we show the sum of the 
main effect of a given loan variable and the coefficient on the interaction between the loan varia-
ble and the race dichotomous variable. In short, the figures show the total effects of each loan 
variable for the respective ethnic categories. The coefficient for an ethnic group is italicized if it 
is statistically different at the 5 percent level from the corresponding figure for whites. The bot-
tom portion of the first panel shows the p-value of a test of the hypothesis that the interaction 
terms are jointly significant (for example, 0.110 for the probability of making a gift) and the p-
value of a test of the hypothesis that the average marginal effects for each ethnic group are equal 
( 0.001). The figures suggest, then, that the interactions do not jointly improve the explanatory 
power of the equation, but one can reject the hypothesis that the average marginal effects of 
loans are the same across ethnic groups. It is important to note that the figures in the table meas-
ure the total impact of each financial aid variable on giving, including the estimate of the asso-
ciated intercept. However, the average marginal effects recorded toward the bottom of the panel 
do not include the effect of the intercept, because they measure the impact of an incremental in-
crease of a given type of aid rather than the leap from no aid to some aid. The next two panels 
report the same information for scholarships and campus jobs. 
Table A3 reports the results for interactions by gender, and Table A4 does the same for 
interactions with age. The indicator for age takes a value of one if, in a given year, the individual 
graduated 10 or more years ago, and zero otherwise, and is estimated for the sample of those 
who were out of college for at least 10 years. Coefficients for men and older alumni that are sig-
nificantly different from the corresponding coefficients for women and younger alumni, respec-
tively, are italicized. As noted in the text, there are generally (but not always) no statistically dis-
cernible differences by demographic group. 
                                                 
19 Because there are so few Native Americans in our sample, they are not included in this analysis. 23 
 
Table 1* 
Probability of Making a Gift 
 
 
(1) 
Main  
Specification  
(2) 
Including Field  
Variables 
 
(3) 
Including 3-Digit 
ZIP Effects 
Loans  0.00407** 
(0.00168) 
0.00493** 
(0.00210) 
0.00457** 
(0.00164) 
Loans
2  -0.000155** 
(4.35x10
-5) 
-0.000184** 
(4.35x10
-5) 
-0.000167** 
(4.21x10
-5) 
Any Loan Aid  -0.0357** 
(0.0175) 
-0.0436** 
(0.0201) 
-0.0390** 
(0.0172) 
p-Value of Joint Significance 
of Loan Variables  0.000  0.001  0.000 
Scholarships  0.000551 
(0.000388) 
0.000177 
(0.000423) 
0.000515 
(0.000383) 
Scholarships
2  -3.23x10
-6 
(2.42x10
-6) 
-1.21x10
-6 
(2.69x10
-6) 
-3.18x10
-6 
(2.38x10
-6) 
Any Scholarship Aid  -0.00704 
(0.0181) 
0.00260 
(0.0191) 
-0.0123 
(0.0180) 
p-Value of Joint Significance 
of Scholarship Variables  0.528  0.950  0.609 
Jobs  -0.00581** 
(0.00244) 
-0.00460* 
(0.00254) 
-0.00540** 
(0.00241) 
Jobs
2  0.000386** 
(8.85x10
-5) 
0.000335** 
(8.82x10
-5) 
0.000383** 
(8.73x10
-5) 
Any Job Aid  -0.00907 
(0.0191) 
-0.0107 
(0.0200) 
-0.00282 
(0.0189) 
p-Value of Joint Significance 
of Job Variables  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N  137,699  114,108  137,699 
 
*Each column shows the incremental effect of the respective variables on the probability of making a gift in a given 
year, based on a linear probability model. Column (2) includes indicator variables for the field in which the individ-
ual works, and Column (3) includes indicator variables for the individual’s ZIP code. Each regression includes on 
the right hand side the variables listed in Table A1 as well as class effects, location effects and, time effects. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5 percent level are marked with **, while those signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level are marked with *.  
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Table 2* 
Log Amount Conditional on Giving 
 
 
(1) 
Main  
Specification  
(2) 
Including Field  
Variables 
 
(3) 
Including 3-Digit 
ZIP Effects 
Loans  -0.00344 
(0.00520) 
-0.00575 
(0.00609) 
-0.00294 
(0.00505) 
Loans
2  2.50x10
-5 
(0.000145) 
8.43x10
-5 
(0.000171) 
1.27x10
-5 
(0.000139) 
Any Loan Aid  -0.0679 
(0.0512) 
-0.0475 
(0.0568) 
-0.0742 
(0.0502) 
p-Value of Joint Significance 
of Loan Variables  0.002  0.004  0.001 
Scholarships  0.00162 
(0.00108) 
0.00180 
(0.00117) 
0.00179* 
(0.00107) 
Scholarships
2  -4.90x10
-6 
(6.92x10
-6) 
-6.46x10
-6 
(7.69x10
-6) 
-5.44x10
-6 
(6.82x10
-6) 
Any Scholarship Aid  -0.188** 
(0.0492) 
-0.184** 
(0.0512) 
-0.186** 
(0.0483) 
p-Value of Joint Significance 
of Scholarship Variables  0.000  0.001  0.000 
Jobs  -0.000383 
(0.00651) 
-0.00231 
(0.00681) 
-0.00123 
(0.00641) 
Jobs
2  -0.000147 
(0.000216) 
-8.51x10
-5 
(0.000226) 
-7.69x10
-5 
(0.000216) 
Any Job Aid  0.0149 
(0.0522) 
0.0451 
(0.0541) 
0.0196 
(0.0514) 
p-Value of Joint Significance 
of Job Variables  0.041  0.505  0.743 
N  84,394  74,920  84,394 
 
*Each column shows the incremental effects of the respective variables on the log amount of the gift, conditional on 
making a gift, estimated by ordinary least squares and using observations with a positive gift. Column (2) includes 
indicator variables for the field in which the individual works, and Column (3) includes indicator variables for the 
individual’s ZIP code. Each regression includes on the right hand side the variables listed in Table A1 as well as 
class effects, location effects and, time effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5 
percent level are marked with **, while those significant at the 10 percent level are marked with *. 
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Table 3* 
Probability of Being a Class Leaders 
 
 
(1) 
Main  
Specification  
(2) 
Including Field  
Variables 
 
(3) 
Including 3-Digit 
ZIP Effects 
Loans  -0.000754** 
(0.000997) 
-0.00113 
(0.00134) 
-0.000608** 
(0.000971) 
Loans
2  2.03x10
-6 
(2.77x10
-5) 
8.00x10
-6 
(3.84x10
-5) 
-1.40x10
-6 
(2.67x10
-5) 
Any Loan Aid  -0.00920 
(0.00994) 
-0.00736 
(0.0124) 
-0.0102 
(0.00980) 
p-Value of Joint Significance 
of Loan Variables  0.005  0.005  0.005 
Scholarships  0.000369* 
(0.000200) 
0.000345 
(0.000235) 
0.000407** 
(0.000195) 
Scholarships
2  -1.45x10
-6 
(1.23x10
-6) 
-1.38x10
-6 
(1.49x10
-6) 
-1.61x10
-6 
(1.21x10
-6) 
Any Scholarship Aid  -0.0326** 
(0.00967) 
-0.0337** 
(0.0111) 
-0.0325** 
(0.00961) 
p-Value of Joint Significance 
of Scholarship Variables  0.004  0.016  0.003 
Jobs  -0.000579 
(0.00145) 
4.76x10
-5 
(0.00158) 
-0.000765 
(0.00143) 
Jobs
2  2.38x10
-5 
(5.72x10
-5) 
-5.94x10
-7 
(5.96x10
-5) 
3.42x10
-5 
(5.71x10
-5) 
Any Job Aid  -0.00610 
(0.0107) 
-0.00313 
(0.0123) 
-0.00415 
(0.0107) 
p-Value of Joint Significance 
of Job Variables  0.708  0.992  0.745 
N  137,699  114,108  137,699 
 
*Each column shows the incremental effects of the respective financial aid variables on being a “class leader” in a 
given year, where a class leader is defined as an individual who donated an amount greater than or equal to the 90
th 
percentile of gifts in his or her class. Estimation is based on a linear probability model. Column (2) includes indica-
tor variables for the field in which the individual works, and Column (3) includes indicator variables for the individ-
ual’s ZIP code. Each regression includes on the right hand side the variables listed in Table A1 as well as class ef-
fects, location effects and, time effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5 percent 
level are marked with **, while those significant at the 10 percent level are marked with *. 26 
 
Table A1* 
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Description  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
TotalYear  Total giving for year (2009 dollars) conditional on making a gift  173.26  2753.20 
Didgive  1 if any donation given in year  0.613  0.487 
Loans  Total loan aid (2009 dollars) conditional on receiving loan aid  7252  9735 
Any Loan Aid  Received any loan aid  0.444  0.497 
Scholarships 
Total scholarship aid (2009 dollars) conditional on receiving scho-
larship aid  29,327  43,691 
Any Scholarship Aid  Received any scholarship aid  0.442  0.497 
Campus Jobs  Total job aid (2009 dollars) conditional on receiving job aid  3940  5564 
Any Job Aid  Received any job aid  0.404  0.491 
Yearssince  Number of years since graduation  6.18  3.83 
Yearssince2  Number of years since graduation, squared  52.87  57.21 
Spouseisalum  1 if the spouse is an alumnus  0.151  0.358 
Male  1 if the alumnus is male  0.543  0.498 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
White  Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus is White  0.743  0.437 
Amerind  1 if the alumnus is a Native American  0.0045  0.0671 
Black  1 if the alumnus is Black  0.0666  0.249 
Hispanic  1 if the alumnus is Hispanic  0.0582  0.234 
Asian  1 if the alumnus is Asian  0.127  0.333 
Secondary Schooling 
 
Public 
 
Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus attended public school  0.557  0.497 
Boarding  1 if the alumnus attended boarding school  0.128  0.334 
Private  1 if the alumnus attended private school  0.314  0.464 
School - Other  1 if the alumnus attended another type of school  0.0017  0.0415 
SATmath  SAT math score. Scores prior to 1996 are adjusted to reflect re-
centering of the scoring scale. 
714  67.4 27 
 
SATverbal  SAT verbal score. Scores prior to 1996 are adjusted to reflect re-
centering of the scoring scale. 
712  66.4 
Admissions Office 
“Non-Academic” 
Ranking 
 
A 
Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus received the highest non-
academic ranking from the admissions office  0.0224  0.148 
B  1 if the alumnus received the second highest non-academic ranking 
from the admissions office 
0.193  0.395 
C  1 if the alumnus received the third highest non-academic ranking 
from the admissions office 
0.467  0.499 
D  1 if the alumnus received the fourth highest non-academic ranking 
from the admissions office 
0.299  0.458 
E  1 if the alumnus received the fifth highest non-academic ranking 
from the admissions office 
0.0192  0.137 
Admissions Office 
“Academic” Ranking 
 
A 
Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus received the highest academic 
ranking from the admissions office  0.228  0.419 
B  1 if the alumnus received the second highest academic ranking 
from the admissions office 
0.407  0.491 
C  1 if the alumnus received the third highest academic ranking from 
the admissions office 
0.217  0.412 
D  1 if the alumnus received the fourth highest academic ranking from 
the admissions office 
0.121  0.326 
E  1 if the alumnus received the fifth highest academic ranking from 
the admissions office 
0.0268  0.161 
Clubsport  1 if the alumnus played on a club team  0.130  0.337 
Honors  1 if the alumnus graduated magna, summa, or cum laude  0.463  0.499 
Greek  1 if the alumnus was a member of a fraternity or sorority  0.730  0.444 
Athlete  1 if the alumnus played a varsity sport  0.377  0.485 
Major  
 
Molbio  Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus majored in molecular biology  0.0591  0.236 
Small Social Science  1 if the alumnus majored in Anthropology, Urban Studies, or  
Sociology. 
0.0375  0.190 
English  1 if the alumnus majored in English  0.101  0.301 
Economics  1 if the alumnus majored in Economics  0.0889  0.285 
Public Policy  1 if the alumnus majored in Public Policy  0.0634  0.244 28 
 
Political Science  1 if the alumnus majored in Political Science  0.0998  0.300 
Psychology  1 if the alumnus majored in Psychology  0.0470  0.212 
History  1 if the alumnus majored in History  0.110  0.313 
MAE  1 if the alumnus majored in Mechanical/Aerospace Engineering  0.0348  0.183 
EE/CS  1 if the alumnus majored in Electrical Engineering or Computer 
Science 
0.0589  0.235 
Arch & Civ  1 if the alumnus majored in Architecture or Civil Engineering  0.0565  0.231 
Small Humanities 
1 if the alumnus majored in Art, Art History, Classics, East Asian 
Studies, Linguistics, Music, Near Eastern Studies, Philosophy, 
Religion, or Languages and Literature departments  
0.109  0.312 
Small Engineering  1 if the alumnus majored in “Engineering”, Operations Research 
and Financial Engineering, or Chemical Engineering 
0.0321  0.176 
Small Sciences 
1 if the alumnus majored in Applied Mathematics, Astrophysics, 
Biochemistry, Biology, Chemistry, Ecology and Evolutionary 
Biology, Geology, Mathematics, Physics, or Statistics 
0.102  0.302 
Minor  
 
No Minor  Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus received no minor  0.682  0.466 
African/African-
American Studies 
1 if the alumnus received a minor in African or African-American 
Studies 
0.0221  0.147 
American Studies  1 if the alumnus received a minor in American Studies  0.03004  0.171 
Latin  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Latin  0.0078  0.0880 
Finance  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Finance  0.0231  0.150 
Theater  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Theater  0.0184  0.134 
Public Policy  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Public Policy  0.0562  0.230 
Other Engineering 
1 if the alumnus received a minor in Architecture, Basic Engineer-
ing, Bioengineering, Electrical Engineering, Geological Engineer-
ing, Management, Materials Sciences, or Robotics. 
0.0199  0.140 
Other Sciences 
1 if the alumnus received a minor in Applied and Computational 
Mathematics, Biophysics, Cognitive Studies, Environmental Stu-
dies, Science in Human Affairs, or Neuroscience. 
0.0559  0.230 
Other Humanities  1 if the alumnus received a minor in a humanities field  0.0966  0.295 
Teaching  1 if the alumnus received a teaching certificate  0.0172  0.130 
Reunion  1 if the year after graduation is a multiple of 5  0.162  0.368 29 
 
 
Post Baccalaureate 
Education 
 
No Advanced  Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus has no advanced degree  0.794  0.404 
PhD  1 if the alumnus has a Ph.D. or equivalent degree  0.0387  0.183 
Masters  1 if the alumnus has a masters  0.0619  0.241 
JD  1 if the alumnus has a JD  0.0428  0.202 
MD/DDS  1 if the alumnus has a medical degree  0.0411  0.198 
MBA  1 if the alumnus has an MBA  0.0415  0.199 
 
* These summary statistics are based on 137,699 observations between 1994 and 2009 of 13,831 alumni who gradu-
ated from 1993 to 2005. The unit of observation is the alumnus-year giving opportunity.  
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Table A2* 
Race and the Effects of Financial Aid 
 
   
(1) 
Probability  
of Making a Gift  
(2) 
Log Amount  
Conditional on Giving 
(3) 
Probability of Being a 
Class Leader 
Loans       
White 
Linear  0.00514**  
(0.00199) 
-0.00840 
(0.00630) 
-0.00151 
(0.00127) 
Quadratic  -0.000179** 
(5.15x10
-5) 
0.000197 
(0.000171) 
2.27x10
-5 
(3.55x10
-5) 
Indicator  -0.0465**  
(0.0212) 
-0.0369 
(0.0641) 
-0.00501 
(0.0128) 
Black 
Linear  -0.0109*  
(0.00579) 
0.00648 
(0.0149) 
-0.00245 
(0.00243) 
Quadratic  0.000122 
(0.000138) 
-0.000254 
(0.000376) 
2.98x10
-5 
(5.58x10
-5) 
Indicator  0.0692  
(0.0634) 
-0.202 
(0.145) 
0.00868 
(0.0266) 
Hispanic 
Linear  0.00910  
(0.00597) 
-0.0123 
(0.0154) 
0.00131 
(0.00303) 
Quadratic  -0.000209  
(0.000156) 
9.92x10
-5  
(0.000430) 
-3.27x10
-5 
(9.10x10
-5) 
Indicator  -0.0793  
(0.0654) 
0.243 
(0.156) 
0.0219 
(0.0331) 
Asian 
Linear  0.00331 
(0.00549) 
0.0168 
(0.0189) 
0.00402 
(0.00312) 
Quadratic  -8.98x10
-5  
(0.000166) 
-0.000627  
(0.000640) 
-0.000143 
(0.000105) 
Indicator  -0.0214  
(0.0451) 
-0.210 
(0.132) 
-0.0408* 
(0.0228) 
p-Value for Joint Significance of  
All Interaction Coefficients  0.110  0.433  0.365 
p-Value for Equality of  
Average Marginal Effects  0.001  0.431  0.181 31 
 
 
Scholarships       
White 
Linear  0.000958*  
(0.000503) 
0.00266*  
(0.00146) 
0.000262 
(0.000272) 
Quadratic  -6.99x10
-6**  
(3.31x10
-6) 
-1.84x10
-5*  
(9.96x10
-6) 
-2.00x10
-6 
(1.76x10
-6) 
Indicator  -0.00531  
(0.0219) 
-0.227** 
(0.0618) 
-0.0325** 
(0.0127) 
Black 
Linear  0.00232*  
(0.00127) 
0.00176 
(0.00305) 
0.000763 
(0.000438) 
Quadratic  -1.46x10
-5**  
(7.09x10
-6) 
2.43x10
-6  
(1.71x10
-5) 
-3.96x10
-6 
(2.57x10
-6) 
Indicator  -0.0524 
(0.0711) 
-0.156 
(0.169) 
-0.000456 
(0.0247) 
Hispanic 
Linear  -0.00271**  
(0.00129) 
0.00378 
(0.00342) 
0.000508 
(0.000614) 
Quadratic  1.61x10
-5**  
(7.37x10
-6) 
-1.97x10
-5 
(1.97x10
-5) 
-1.08x10
-6 
(3.36x10
-6) 
Indicator  0.0998 
(0.0672) 
-0.204 
(0.165) 
-0.0806** 
(0.0316) 
Asian 
Linear  0.000287 
(0.00100) 
0.00116 
(0.00262) 
0.000844 
(0.000462) 
Quadratic  -3.76x10
-7  
(6.13x10
-6) 
8.85x10
-6  
(1.61x10
-5) 
-2.51x10
-6 
(2.96x10
-6) 
Indicator  -0.0158 
(0.0433) 
-0.00777 
(0.0955) 
-0.0194 
(0.0158) 
p-Value for Joint Significance of  
All Interaction Coefficients  0.162  0.005  0.010 
p-Value for Equality of  
Average Marginal Effects  0.143  0.987  0.423 32 
 
 
Campus Jobs       
White 
Linear  -0.00738**  
(0.00288) 
-0.000784 
(0.00784) 
-0.000411 
(0.00184) 
Quadratic  0.000447**  
(0.000100) 
-0.000133 
(0.000251) 
0.0000278 
(0.0000734) 
Indicator  -0.0219 
(0.0228) 
0.0186 
(0.0643) 
-0.00953 
(0.0140) 
Black 
Linear  -0.00154 
(0.00707) 
0.0102 
(0.0166) 
-0.000141 
(0.00276) 
Quadratic  0.000262  
(0.000243) 
-0.000374 
(0.000558) 
3.21x10
-5 
(0.000107) 
Indicator  0.0593 
( 0.0657) 
-0.0471 
(0.149) 
-0.00445 
(0.0235) 
Hispanic 
Linear  -0.00255 
( 0.0122) 
-0.0312 
(0.0226) 
-0.00110 
(0.00522) 
Quadratic  0.000273 
(0.000501) 
0.000786 
(0.000752) 
-1.89x10
-5 
(0.000183) 
Indicator  -0.00839 
(0.0794) 
0.0731 
(0.182) 
-0.00834 
(0.0370) 
Asian 
Linear  -0.00152 
(0.00823) 
-0.00351 
(0.0270) 
-0.00219 
(0.00515) 
Quadratic  3.73x10
-5  
(0.000363) 
-8.00x10
-5  
(0.00132) 
6.58x10
-5 
(0.000281) 
Indicator  0.0213 
(0.0527) 
0.00443 
(0.139) 
0.0112 
(0.0241) 
p-Value for Joint Significance of  
All Interaction Coefficients  0.430  0.972  0.979 
p-Value for Equality of  
Average Marginal Effects  0.421  0.520  0.906 
 
*This table shows, for each racial category, the sum of the main effect of a given financial aid variable and the coef-
ficient on the interaction between the financial aid variable and the race dichotomous variable. Coefficients for each 
race that are significantly different from the corresponding coefficient for whites are italicized. Coefficients signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level are marked with **, while those significant at the 10 percent level are marked with *. 
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Table A3* 
Gender and the Effects of Financial Aid 
 
   
(1) 
Probability  
of Making a Gift  
(2) 
Log Amount  
Conditional on Giving 
(3) 
Probability of Being a 
Class Leader 
Loans       
Female 
Linear  0.00211 
(0.00264) 
-0.00623 
(0.00777) 
-0.000624 
(0.00151) 
Quadratic  -0.000117 
(7.14x10
-5) 
0.000107 
(0.000219) 
7.41x10
-6 
(4.44x10
-5) 
Indicator  -0.0277** 
(0.0260) 
0.0209 
(0.0692) 
-3.15x10
-5 
(0.0136) 
Male 
Linear  0.00552** 
(0.00217) 
-0.000542 
(0.00691) 
-0.000849 
(0.00131) 
Quadratic  -0.000180** 
(5.48x10
-5) 
-5.06x10
-5 
(0.0001871) 
-8.20x10
-7 
(3.47x10
-5) 
Indicator  -0.0430* 
(0.0235) 
-0.148* 
(0.0741) 
-0.0167 
(0.0142) 
p-Value for Joint Significance of  
All Interaction Coefficients  0.579  0.168  0.254 
p-Value for Equality of  
Average Marginal Effects  0.284  0.602  0.786 
Scholarships       
Female 
Linear  0.00156** 
(0.000548) 
3.20x10
-5 
(0.00137) 
0.000367 
(0.000237) 
Quadratic  -8.59x10
-6** 
(3.42x10
-6) 
5.93x10
-6 
(8.89x10
-6) 
-9.82x10
-7 
(1.45x10
-6) 
Indicator  -0.0229 
(0.0262) 
-0.228** 
(0.0635) 
-0.0493** 
(0.0117) 
Male 
Linear  -0.000413 
(0.000544) 
0.00297 
(0.00163) 
0.000362 
(0.000313) 
Quadratic  1.95x10
-6 
(3.38x10
-6) 
-1.41x10
-5 
(1.03x10
-5) 
-1.83x10
-6 
(1.94x10
-6) 
Indicator  0.00890 
(0.0248) 
-0.150** 
(0.0728) 
-0.0184 
(0.0147) 
p-Value for Joint Significance of  
All Interaction Coefficients  0.042  0.145  0.223 
p-Value for Equality of  
Average Marginal Effects  0.007  0.200  0.837 34 
 
 
Campus Jobs       
Female 
Linear  -0.00919** 
(0.00343) 
-0.00735 
(0.00794) 
-0.00169 
(0.00172) 
Quadratic  0.000504** 
(0.000124) 
-0.000104 
(0.000198) 
3.79x10
-5 
(5.68x10
-5) 
Indicator  -0.00938 
(0.0275) 
-0.00939 
(0.0275) 
0.00519 
(0.0140) 
Male 
Linear  -0.00174 
(0.00375) 
0.00381 
(0.0114) 
0.000251 
(0.00242) 
Quadratic  0.000229 
(0.000146) 
-0.000130 
(0.000455) 
1.27x10
-5 
(0.000105) 
Indicator  -0.0114 
(0.0270) 
-0.0378 
(0.0792) 
-0.0155 
(0.0162) 
p-Value for Joint Significance of  
All Interaction Coefficients  0.297  0.385  0.677 
p-Value for Equality of  
Average Marginal Effects  0.159  0.309  0.414 
 
 
*This table shows, for each gender, the sum of the main effect of a given financial aid variable and the coefficient on 
the interaction between the financial aid variable and the gender dichotomous variable. Coefficients for men that are 
significantly different from the corresponding coefficient for women are italicized. Coefficients significant at the 5 
percent level are marked with **, while those significant at the 10 percent level are marked with *. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
Table A4* 
Age and the Effects of Financial Aid 
 
   
(1) 
Probability  
of Making a Gift 
(2) 
Log Amount  
Conditional on Giving 
(3) 
Probability of Being a 
Class Leader 
Loans       
Younger 
Linear  0.00456* 
(0.00234) 
-0.00545 
(0.00694) 
-0.00205 
(0.00150) 
Quadratic  -0.000155** 
(5.58x10
-5) 
2.69x10
-5 
(0.000178) 
2.23x10
-5 
(4.03x10
-5) 
Indicator  -0.0495* 
(0.0256) 
-0.0675 
(0.0737) 
-0.00218 
(0.0149) 
Older 
Linear  0.00303 
(0.00308) 
-0.00457 
(0.0120) 
-0.000394 
(0.00163) 
Quadratic  -0.000135* 
(7.52x10
-5) 
0.000136 
(0.000314) 
1.28x10
-6 
(4.03x10
-5) 
Indicator  -0.0137 
(0.0336) 
-0.0318 
(0.125) 
-0.00865 
(0.0196) 
p-Value for Joint Significance of  
Interaction Coefficients  0.505  0.341  0.270 
p-Value for Equality of  
Average Marginal Effects  0.537  0.730  0.203 
Scholarships       
Younger 
Linear  0.000562 
(0.000584) 
0.00117 
(0.00155) 
0.000458 
(0.000296) 
Quadratic  -4.15x10
-6 
(4.08x10
-6) 
-3.21x10
-6 
(1.14x10
-5) 
-2.38x10
-6 
(2.08x10
-6) 
Indicator  -0.00577 
(0.0237) 
-0.108* 
(0.0595) 
-0.0296** 
(0.0125) 
Older 
Linear  0.000535 
(0.000761) 
0.00130 
(0.00285) 
0.000319 
(0.000426) 
Quadratic  -6.42x10
-6 
(5.34x10
-6) 
2.13x10
-6 
(2.10x10
-5) 
-1.08x10
-6 
(3.00x10
-6) 
Indicator  0.0147 
(0.0312) 
-0.248** 
(0.105) 
-0.0278 
(0.0179) 
p-Value for Joint Significance of  
Interaction Coefficients  0.210  0.254  0.947 
p-Value for Equality of  
Average Marginal Effects  0.770  0.820  0.802 36 
 
 
Campus Jobs       
Younger 
Linear  -0.00326 
(0.00325) 
-5.49x10
-5 
(0.00848) 
-0.000391 
(0.00188) 
Quadratic  0.000295** 
(0.000107) 
-1.88x10
-5 
(0.000272) 
3.79x10
-5 
(7.09x10
-5) 
Indicator  -0.0211 
(0.0250) 
0.000377 
(0.0642) 
-0.00163 
(0.0138) 
Older 
Linear  -0.00689 
(0.00422) 
-0.00685 
(0.0137) 
-0.000715 
(0.00244) 
Quadratic  0.000516** 
(0.000139) 
-0.000231 
(0.000361) 
-1.41x10
-5 
(7.65x10
-5) 
Indicator  0.0153 
(0.0323) 
0.0619 
(0.115) 
-0.00207 
(0.0200) 
p-Value for Joint Significance of  
Interaction Coefficients  0.177  0.081  0.167 
p-Value for Equality of  
Average Marginal Effects  0.491  0.387  0.648 
 
 
*This table shows, for each age category (graduated more than ten years ago and graduated less than ten years ago), 
the sum of the main effect of a given financial aid variable and the coefficient on the interaction between the finan-
cial aid variable and the age dichotomous variable. Coefficients for older alumni that are significantly different from 
the corresponding coefficient for younger alumni are italicized. Coefficients significant at the 5 percent level are 
marked with **, while those significant at the 10 percent level are marked with *. 
 